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    "text": "Carter’s DOE Secretary wanted to respond to the oil crisis with a national building code with efficiency standards. Dunkelman cites to Stuart Eizenstat’s book, below",
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          "alt": "184 WHY NOTHING WORKS\nCongress passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, sanding down what remained of the trucking industry's antitrust exemption, and thereby preventing trucking companies from coordinating their rates. But here, as in so many other realms, the progressive movement remained on a knifes edge, even if the ideological combatants were mostly unaware that each similar battle was part of a broader struggle. That tension between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian approaches was perhaps most potently apparent in what may well have been the most defining issue of Carter's presidency: oil.\nThe oil crisis had been born from OPEC's decision to raise oil prices by constricting supply. The ensuing debate in Washington centered on whether government was, in fact, responsible for creating the crisis, and how it might divine a way out. Those embracing a most Hamiltonian ilk, led by Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger, wanted to use centralized regulation to drive down consumption. To impose a national building code requiring more heat efficiency. To prohibit banks from writing mortgages for homes that lacked proper insulation. To provide tax incentives for fuel-efficient cars, even if that advantaged Japanese imports. But many on Carter's White House staff argued not for centralizing to reduce demand for oil, but for granting more authority to oil companies to drill.* They were steeped in the notion that the government's scheme to insulate the domestic energy sector, now nearly two decades old, had backfired.*s Carter's decision ultimately to take Schlesinger's side in a variety of intra-administration fights burnished a sense that the president was not, deep down, the reformer many wanted him to be—he was less the master of progressivism's two competing impulses than a fickle mistress. He wanted to deregulate, and he embraced efforts to let cable companies, railroads, and even banks get out from under what he deemed as the heavy hand of government meddling, claiming j…",
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          "alt": "Schlesinger's plan called for roughly $1 billion in tax credits to encourage insulation, and he was considering establishing insulation standards below which banks would be prohibited from writing home mortgages. This immediately drew strong objections from Blumenthal and Schultze, who pointed out that it would make banks federal inspectors of home insulation. Schultze also challenged Schlesinger's estimates that his insulation initiatives would save one million barrels of oil a day, since wealthier property owners— the ones who used more fuel-were already retrofitting their homes. That ended bank certification right there.\nSchlesinger then discussed a national building code to focus on energy conservation, which would raise constitutional questions by superseding local codes. And who would perform the inspections to ensure compliance? I noted privately in the margin of my legal pad that while we were about to announce a comprehensive national plan, at this late stage we were only beginning to examine such critical issues. Schlesinger was also forced to retreat on mandatory efficiency standards for industrial motors and boilers.\nBlumenthal and Schultze argued it would be simpler and more effective to require manufacturers to list efficiency ratings so buyers could calculate their own energy-cost savings. Carter weighed in as an engineer: Not only would it be hard to defend specific designs as more efficient, but a bureaucracy would be required to verify the efficiency claims.\nTurning to automobiles, Schlesinger proposed to tax gas guzzlers and offer a rebate to buyers of fuel-efficient cars made in America-but not those made in Japan, where auto engines delivered far better mileage than Detroit's products. Blumenthal, who had been a senior trade negotiator in the Kennedy administration, warned that this would violate a number of our international trade obligations to treat foreign and U.S. products equally and could end with the United States paying Japan $6 billion…",
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    "createdAt": "2025-05-08T17:12:07.885Z"
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