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{
  "text": "”For political reasons, Bonn (along with everyone else) had flaccidly used the argument that INF were a response to the SS-20 threat when in reality German military planners thought INF were a unique NATO need irrespective of Soviet nuclear\nforces.“",
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        "alt": "West Germany was instrumental in advocating a long-range land-based missile capability in the late 1970s to achieve a force posture compatible with its preference on the nuclear deterrent continuum. Responsi ble government officials knew that INF arms control was working at cross-purposes with the secret evolution of doctrine. Defence Ministry planners believed that cruise and Pershing II were the optimum means for implementing the doctrinal requirements codified in the new nuclear guidelines passed only in October 1986. Bonn's problem was that the government had never made a strong public case for the real doctrinal reasons they believed INF necessary.\" For political reasons, Bonn (along with everyone else) had flaccidly used the argument that INF were a response to the SS-20 threat when in reality German military planners thought INF were a unique NATO need irrespective of Soviet nuclear\nforces.\nYet the internal government INF debates involved more than the requirements of deterrence. More fundamental was a reappraisal of Soviet intentions and the appropriate Western response to Gorbachev's 'new political thinking' then underway in Moscow. Tension between the CDU/ CSU and their liberal FDP colleagues over arms control policy reflected divergent perceptions of Soviet policies and intentions. Many conservatives remained sceptical of Soviet intentions. Foreign Minister Genscher disagreed strongly, and set out his views in an important speech:\nThe right and absolutely imperative policy for the West today, I believe, is to take Mr. Gorbachev and his 'new policy' literally, with all that this implies. Let us not sit back idly and wait for him to deliver. Let us rather try to influence, expedite and shape developments from our end. Let us take Mr. Gorbachev seriously. Let us take him at his word.'3\nGenscher wanted to 'shape and develop' new policies, more ambitious than traditional NATO orthodoxy. Genscher's motives were also highly political; he hoped to capitalize on g…",
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  "createdAt": "2025-05-13T06:42:12.271Z"
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